Abstract. Safety assessment is a well-established process for assuring the safety and reliability of critical (aeronautical) systems. It uses probabilistic (quantitative) analysis to provide precise measures about the safety requirements of a system. Traditionally, quantitative safety assessment uses fault-tree analysis, but certification authorities also allow the use of Markov models. In this paper we propose a strategy for quantitative safety assessment based on the Prism model-checker. Prism models are extracted systematically from a high-level model via the application of translation rules. We illustrate our strategy with a representative system design from the airborne industry.
Introduction
Traditionally, quantitative safety assessment of aircraft systems is based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [3] . This method is frequently used in industrial applications and it is also indicated by certification authorities. The main reason for its practical acceptance is that FTA is conceptually simple and easy to understand [2] . However, certification authorities also accept the use of Markov Analysis [16] to assure safety requirements on the system design. Both FTA and Markov models use system failure logic information derived from well-known analysis techniques such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Hazard Analysis (FHA) [2] . Based on this information, the analysis methods evaluate the probabilities of the undesired failure conditions to check whether a safety requirement is satisfied or not. Each technique executes this analysis using different mathematical representations; FTA uses static event-based trees and Markov analysis uses stochastic processes. Markov models are more powerful than fault-trees [2] but they are more complex to be handled, and thus, scarcely adopted in industry. In practice, they are created in a non-systematic ad hoc fashion [6, 23] . Despite several automatic model-based approaches for FTA have been proposed [11, 13, 14, 15] using high-level tools like Simulink [9] , the treatment of quantitative parameters using FTA still depends on some human intervention. This can introduce errors in the analysis. Moreover, they are not cost-effective, because the probability of each failure condition (top event) must be evaluated singly (just one failure condition at a time), requiring more effort to undertake the analysis of the whole system [1, 17] .
In this paper we address these problems proposing a strategy for quantitative safety assessment based on the Prism model-checker [7] . This strategy aims at hiding the interaction with Prism, as well as its Markov-based internal representation (semantics), as much as possible from engineers by providing rules that translate a Simulink diagram, annotated with failure conditions and logic [5, 10] , into a Prism model and CSL formulas [8] . We can then check safety requirements, in such a way that we are able to report to the user only those requirements that are not satisfied.
The main contributions of this paper are:
─ A (hidden) Markov-based quantitative model-based safety assessment process;
─ Translation rules that systematically transform Simulink diagrams (tabular structures), into Prism models augmented with CSL formulas that can automatically verify the quantitative requirements of the system; ─ The use of a single model from which it is possible to check any failure condition of a system.
The work presented in [4] defines a methodology that integrates a functional (qualitative) analysis with a non-functional (quantitative) analysis over the system design. In this paper we detail the non-functional analysis strategy, with focus on the automatic model generation and analysis from Simulink diagrams.
The following section presents an overview of (model-based) quantitative safety assessment. In Section 3 we describe our strategy for safety assessment and the rules for the Prism model generation. In Section 4 we show the application of our strategy to a simple aircraft subsystem. Section 5 considers related work and Section 6 shows our conclusions and future work.
2

Overview of Quantitative Safety Assessment
The safety assessment process involves complex phases and activities [1, 2] , which aim to minimize the occurrence likelihood of potential hazards. During this process, hazard analysis is performed in parallel with system design. As a result, qualitative and quantitative safety requirements are introduced in the top-level and subsystem design. They comprehend the high-level airplane goals as well as system safety goals that must be considered in the proposed system architectures. Certification authorities accept FTA, Markov analysis or dependence diagrams as alternatives to perform quantitative safety assessment. The basic information used as input to these techniques are failure conditions and failure rates. Failure conditions are events of the system (hazards) whose occurrence may lead to a critical situation. They are identified during the FHA analysis, which considers the severity of each failure condition occurrence over the aircraft functions to define the related safety requirement, using an argument (maximum tolerable probability). For example, FHA determines that the probability of occurrence of a catastrophic failure condition must not be greater than 10 -9 per flight hour. Failure rate is an attribute used to model the likelihood of each basic failure mode (primary and independent failure) of the system. FMEA is a bottom-up method for assessing the failure modes of a system and determining the effects of the relations among these failures. It supplies the failure rates considered in the system. Essentially, a quantitative analysis aims to make reliability predictions for the system. For the certification of an aircraft, it must calculate the average probability of such failure conditions per flight hour, assuming the appropriate exposure time of failures and shows if the results are tolerable.
In the safety-critical systems domain there is an increasing trend towards modelbased safety assessment [11, 13] . It proposes to extend the existing model-based development activities (simulation, verification, testing and code generation), which are based on a high-level model of the system (expressed in a notation such as Simulink or Statemate), to incorporate safety analyses. These new alternatives are interesting because they are simple, compositional and do not depend on the engineer's skills to be applied. In addition, they can use formal methods, for instance theorem provers, model-checkers and static-checkers [13, 15] , to automate, even if partially, the analysis. Moreover, formal methods are one of the alternative methods proposed in DO-178B [12] for the airborne software certification.
Most model-based strategies for safety assessment are mainly based on FHA and FMEA [11] (and in particular on its newer variant, IF-FMEA ---Interface-Focused FMEA [5, 10] ). IF-FMEA is of particular interest because it uses a hierarchical tabular structure (see Fig. 1 ) very useful to capture the transformation and propagation of failures in a system, allowing that complex systems be modeled in a compositional way. Considering the identified failure conditions, and their tolerable rates, during the FHA analysis they are also included in a tabular structure [2, 5] , which can be easily incorporated into a design tool like Simulink, using annotations. 
Overview of Prism towards Safety Analysis
Prism [7, 8] is a formal probabilistic analysis tool that enables the analysis of Markov models specified in discrete time (DTMC), continuous time (CTMC), and Markov decision processes (MDP). Modules and variables are the basic components of the language and the system is built from the parallel composition of a set of modules.
Modules can interact with each other (synchronization) and contain a number of variables that reflect their possible states. The behavior of a module is determined by a list of guarded commands. Each command (initiated by a [], possibly with a label inside) is formed of a guard (boolean expression before the symbol ->) followed by a rate or probability (where 1 means 100%) based transition (where dashed decorated state variables are assigned values, standing for a state update). The transitions represent which state changes are possible and how often they occur. Fig. 2 illustrates a Prism specification of two modules. Its Markov representation is shown at the right-hand side of this figure. The first line of this specification states that we are considering a continuous time Markov chain that is composed of a set of discrete states, where each of them is the representation of the state (operational, degraded and faulty) of each failure mode (local variables) of a component. This chain of events requires the use of exponential probability distributions for modeling failure mode rates and repairs (this is why we use the CTMC model).
Fig. 2. System representation using Prism
The first module, PowerSource1, specifies an abstract failure behavior of a power source. The variable ps1_lowpower represents its single failure mode. The first transition captures one of the possible changes in the failure mode: from an operational state it can fail with a rate of 5e -4 (failure/hour). The next two commands represent repair transitions. These commands are synchronized (the labels inside [ and ] state the synchronization points) with the module Monitor. They work similarly to the first transition of this module, except that they need to synchronize with the corresponding labels of the module Monitor, allowing them to be triggered. The module Monitor also uses a single variable: m_switchFailure. Its first command states a failure transition command whereas the second represents the capability of its single failure mode being repaired with a rate of 1/50 (repair/hour). The last two commands represent repair transitions corresponding to the repair transitions of the PowerSource1.
To analyze the failure behavior of this system, we can use, depending on the purpose, a steady-state or transient analysis [16] . Transient analysis represents the instantaneous failure rate over a single period T whereas the steady-state analysis approximates the long-term average failure rate over multiple time intervals T. The choice over these types of analyses depends on how system repairs are handled. Transient analysis can be performed in either closed-loop (models with repairs) or open-loop models (models without repairs), whereas the steady-state analysis can be performed only on closed-loop models. Fig. 2 shows that our proposed model considers repair transitions as if they occurred at constant rates, thus it is a typical closed-loop model and both analyses can be performed. We calculate the average rate of a failure condition applying the steady-state analysis. Particularly, the steady-state analysis provides adequate accuracy on their results for certification purposes, since as well as the model shown in Fig. 2 , most critical systems are modeled in such a way that they can deal with latency. In this scenario, several components affecting the system functionality must be monitored, maintained at regular intervals and repaired if they are faulty. Although the transient analysis is "exact", it applies strictly to just a single interval T, as if this was the entire life of the system, whereas most critical systems have maintenance cycles, where are periodically restored to the full-up condition. Hence, the analysis more representative for this scenario is when the period T usually represents a repetitive repair interval rather than a life limit [16] .
To perform all this quantitative safety analysis Prism uses the CSL language [8] . The operators S (steady-state) and P (transient) of Prism are used to reason about the tolerable probabilities of all system failure conditions. For example, with the formula:
we can check if, in the long run, the probability that a certain "Failure Condition" can occur is less than or equal to 10 -9 . Note that the evaluation of such an expression yields "yes" or "no", based on the corresponding quantitative analysis (the value is implicit). We can also check the exact probability itself by using another CSL formula
This yields the instantaneous probability of occurrence of a certain "Failure Condition" within 3600 time units.
Proposed Strategy
In this section we present our strategy to perform quantitative safety assessment using the Prism model-checker [7] . Fig. 3 presents an overview of our strategy. It starts by collecting the system description, which contains the system block diagrams and a failure logic model. With this information, we apply our translation rules to create a Prism specification and the associated CSL formulas to analyze the safety requirements of this specification. Then, the Prism model-checker is invoked to check all formulas and only when one of them is not satisfied, this is reported to the user. 
Input Data Model
Although the annotations that we use in the Simulink diagram are similar to the tabular structures presented during the safety analysis, our rules are stated in terms of the abstract syntax presented in Fig. 4 . These data structures are an abstract representation of all the information introduced previously (see Section 2). We start by considering a system (System) as a structure that contains a name (System_Name) and a list of subsystems (Seq(Subsystem)). Each subsystem can be another system or a module, because components can also be systems. A module (Module) represents the lower level component that has a name, a list of ports (Seq(Ports)), a list of deviations (Seq(Deviation)), a list of malfunctions (Seq(Malfunction)), the maintenance strategy info and the inspection time. All these elements are associated with the tabular structures used to store all system information about its architecture, hierarchy, failure conditions, failure modes, repairs and the characteristics of monitoring and propagation of component failures. Port is a structure that contains a Port_ID (representing the identifiers of input/output ports) and an AssociatedPort (which stores the connected port of another component).
Annotation is a boolean expression that represents the failure logic of deviations. Its definition considers And/Or operators and their terminal terms can be malfunction names or deviations from any port. Criticality represents a real number ( ) used to quantify the tolerable probability associated with a failure condition (expressed via a deviation). Finally, InspectionTime and Rate are also real numbers used to represent the rate of occurrence of a malfunction and of a repair, respectively.
Translation Rules
Our strategy applies a set of translation rules that are based on the abstract syntax of Fig. 4 . To ease the overall understanding of their applicability we also provide the typical sequence of their application in Fig. 5 . The strategy always starts by applying Rule 1, which states that we are dealing with a CTMC Markov model and applies other rules to create the several Prism modules from the system components (Rules 2-4). The body of a module is effectively created by Rule 5. After that, basic declaration instructions (Rules 6-8), commands (Rules 9-11) and repair transitions (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) are created. To complete the translation strategy, formula expressions are created (Rules 23-28) using a set of rules that decomposes all logic expressions (Rules 29-35). Some rules are omitted because they are very similar to others presented. For instance, Rules 6 and 7 are missing because they are similar to Rules 2 and 3.
Compound Systems and Subsystems
Our rules are inductively defined on the structure of a Prism system. We start with Rule 1 that takes as argument a pair where the first element has the name of a system (SName) and the second element a list of its subsystems (SubSys). 
Module
As modules can be subsystems as well, we translate modules by using two rules: Rule 4 (which calls function subsystem) and Rule 5 (which starts the creation of a Prism module). Rule 8 uses each component malfunction to generate the declaration of its respective local variable inside the module block. Module Name (MName) and Malfunction Name (MfName) are used to create the local variable name.
Rule 4 |{
Failure Transition Commands
Rule 11 translates each malfunction into a Prism command. It always assumes the guard as a logical conjunction between the negation of a malfunction (this comes from Rule 8) and the negation of the fully failed system situation (a term defined by a Prism formula). If such a guard is valid then, with a rate given by Rate, this malfunction is activated. 
Repair Transition Commands
Rules 12 through 17 translate the maintenance strategy (defined for each component) into Prism repair commands. This is performed according to the classification of each basic component of the system with respect to the treatment of the type of monitoring of its faults. Rule 12 considers two types: Self-monitored and Unmonitored (note the provided clause), whereas Rules 
Formulas
The final elements we address are Prism formulas. They correspond to the failure logic expressions annotated in Simulink diagrams. Rule 28 creates such formulas compounding a name for the formula based on the deviation name (DName), followed by the module name (MName) and the identifier of the port (PortID). The formula's body is a boolean expression resulting from function fExpression.
Rule 28 |{ MName, Ports,(DName, PortID, Annot) }| formula formula DName . MName . PortID = |{ Ports, Annot }| fExpression The entire set of rules can be found in [19] . Using these translation rules, we generate a valid formal failure model retaining the semantics of diagrams and the system hierarchical model.
Modeling Considerations
Our solution still does not consider bidirectional data flows (such as the propagation of failure as short-circuit).Yet, such features can be added by considering new translation rules. Our strategy is sound with respect to the following assumptions:
─ Component failures are detected in flight only and repaired during ground maintenance or before the next flight (description level), but the failures and repairs occur at constant rates (model level).
─ The system is assumed with perfect failure coverage and can to reconfigure to a degradable mode within no time.
In terms of completeness, our rules are complete in the sense that they can translate any Simulink diagram annotated with failure logic in the IF-FMEA style [5] . Besides, this approach is not limited to just using the Simulink diagram as input. Actually, the necessary input data, which contains information from the qualitative model and the respective failure logic and propagation, is obtained from the tabular structures, which are user defined. Simulink diagrams work implicitly with these structures [4, 10] .
Our strategy follows a systematic process that has proved viable and of little impact in practice, since the tabular structures are generated by traditional methods and analyses used by the aircraft industry during the qualitative safety assessment (FHA, FMEA, IF-FMEA, CCA) . So, adding a plug-in to some usual design tool, it is possible to automate our systematic approach.
The primary limitation of a stochastic model-checking is the size of the reachable state space, though recent breakthroughs allow very large (> 10 7 reachable states) state spaces to be explored in reasonable time.
Case Study
Our case study is the Actuator Control System (ACS) (see Fig. 6 ). Its function is to control the displacement of an electrical actuator. Although it is a simple example, it is representative in the aeronautics context in the sense that it has dependent and independent failures, a hierarchical architecture, latency, evident, repeated and developed events [1, 2] . Considering the Simulink diagram of Fig. 6 , annotated with the corresponding failure logic, we can generate the formal specification (see [19] for the complete failure logic of the system), which is depicted in Fig. 7 . The first two modules of the generated Prism model have already been explained in Fig. 2 . The module PowerSource2 is very similar to PowerSource1, and is omitted. The module Sensor contains two local variables that represent its failure modes. For each failure mode we have a command to represent its failure transition. We use a single repair transition to update both failure modes to operational states. The module Actuator contains several local variables and each failure transition is defined considering its corresponding failure rate. Its repair transition considers the repair rate defined for this component. At the end, formulas are defined to capture failure propagation via module outputs. The remaining modules (Reference and Controller) are similar and were omitted for conciseness. The next step is using the Prism model-checker to check whether any critical failure condition probability violates the permitted limit. Considering the tabular information of the ACS, our strategy creates probabilistic temporal formulas to check the following failure conditions: We verify each failure condition using the formula shown in (1), for instance:
After checking this formula, where the exact value of the average probability obtained via steady-state analysis for this situation is 2.54e -3 , Prism returns false, indicating that this failure condition was violated. As we have said previously, this strategy can be performed in a hidden way by instructing the Prism model-checker to check each formula automatically using Simulink plug-ins, for example, in such a way that only when a formula is violated this result can be sent back to engineers. Thus the complete quantitative safety analysis can be hidden from the engineers.
So, from such reports, control engineers must adjust the system design by inserting more fault-tolerance features to avoid such failure violations. When all safety requirements are satisfied, the current system design (including its failure and repair rates) is acceptable. To show this analysis to certification authorities, the Markov model can be extracted from Prism by using tools like SHARPE or HARP [20] .
Furthermore, one can also investigate scenarios of different phases and maintenance strategies using graphs of the instantaneous probabilities during a certain time interval. For instance, Fig. 8 is the result of evaluating the following formula defined in (2), setting the T parameter from 0 to 100 hours. P =? [true U<=T ("WrongPosition_Actuador_Out1")] 
Related Work
A large amount of work has been done for quantitative safety assessment which is based mainly on a previous qualitative analysis. An example of an effort in this direction is the use of FTA to compute the failure conditions probability such as the HAZOP [14] which evolves a design developed in Simulink; another relevant effort is the ISAAC project where SCADE is used for modeling and safety analysis [13, 11] . It is also worth mentioning FSAP/NuSMV-SA [15] , a fault injection approach developed in the ESACS project. Due the limitations of FTA methods, as discussed in Section 1, more recently approaches considering dynamic reliability have been proposed, based on timed-probabilistic models. We highlight two recent approaches.
In the COMPASS project [22] , the model-based probabilistic safety assessment is based on the SLIM (System-Level Integrated Modeling) design language. The approach allows the extension of nominal model of the system adding probabilistic fault behavior, providing a precise characterization of them based on a formal semantics. The analysis is based on a set of verification tools (NuSMV, FSAP, RAT, Sigref, and MRMC) which allows verifying safety/dependability aspects and quantitative analyses (probabilistic analysis of dynamic FTA). The completeness and consistency of this approach qualify it as a promising solution, but the formal modeling language adopted is exposed to the user, demanding that engineers be familiar with this notation. Thus, the impact for the adoption of this solution might be significant; our approach follows the hidden formal methods view.
The work reported in [18] (which proposes pFMEA or Probabilistic FMEA) also uses the Prism model-checker to support quantitative analysis. The approach integrates the failure behavior into the system model described in CTMC via failure injection. In one sense, pFMEA performs a more detailed analysis than ours because it considers faulty as well as normal behaviors of a system. However, this approach does not generate the model systematically, so there is no notion of soundness concerning the model generation, and is more likely to generate state explosion, since it does not present techniques to enable reduction of the Markov model generated.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose a systematic strategy to perform quantitative safety assessment of critical systems. Our approach generates a Prism specification from a Simulink diagram, annotated with failure logic. The strategy also creates CSL formulas that check whether all safety requirements are satisfied.
Prism specifications are interesting because they allow the creation and analysis of Markov chains in a more user-friendly and concise way. They also ease the exploration of aspects such as latent and evident failure, monitoring and repair schedule, which are essential to aeronautical systems, for example.
Moreover, if we consider that the traditional fault-tree model is constructed to assess the cause and probability of a single undesirable failure condition, the effort and number of trees generated to perform the analysis of each failure condition are extremely large, making the process expensive [2, 10] . With Markov chains, for instance, those created via Prism, it is possible to represent all failure conditions of a system with a single model. Also, checking the CSL formulas is less expensive than creating fault-trees. Furthermore, engineers can use the Prism specification (Markov chains) to investigate dynamic aspects of a system: experiments to check existing failure scenarios and Phased Mission can be performed by simply changing the values of local variables of the model [2, 8] . However, the current implementation of Prism also imposes some limitations. We cannot generate counter-examples when some property is violated. Fortunately, recent researches are already identifying counterexamples of stationary models, allowing a better traceability of the basic failures and facilitating the cycle of checking and validating the system design [21] . Unfortunately, this solution is not available in Prism yet.
As future work we intend to mechanize the translation strategy and incorporate it as a plug-in in the Matlab/Simulink software. Another improvement to this work is to consider dynamic behavior for failure recovery, capturing the dynamic information in the same way as the static information. In another direction, we intend to prove its soundness and completeness, showing that our strategy creates a Prism specification whose Markov model is equivalent to a Markov semantics given to Simulink diagrams annotated with failure logic and that it can handle any Simulink diagram.
